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INTRODUCTION
W
hen I was a schoolboy in Bulawayo in 1955 we
saw the world through pink tinted glasses;
almost everywhere we looked we saw the cheerful pink
of colonial British Africa (Fig. 1A): The Union of South
Africa, Bechuanaland, South West Africa, Southern and
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Basutoland, Swaziland
and further north Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda.
While, fifty years later, Britain has gone and a lot of
the names have changed we still see bright pink all
around us (Fig. 1B) though now for rather less cheerful
reasons. Now we see the map of southern Africa
coloured pink because shades of pink are used by the
WHO and UNAIDS to denote levels of HIV infection,
with the deepest shades reserved for those countries
with the highest prevalence, the most severe epidemics.
Ex-British colonies in southern and east Africa are still
coloured pink (Fig. 1B), because they have the dubious
distinction of constituting eleven of the top fifteen
countries in the world in terms of the level at which
adult HIV prevalence, in urban centres, peaked in their
individual epidemics (Fig. 2).
The other four - Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi and
Ethiopia - are not ex-British colonies, but are also all in
southern and east Africa. Although the images in Figs. 1
and 2 are very striking – and although ex-British colo-
nies have an average peak HIV prevalence level 11 per-
centage points higher than countries with a different
colonial past – peak prevalence seems to be more
strongly related to region. A simple analysis of variance
between countries defined as being southern, east, cen-
tral or west accounts for 66% of the variance in peak
HIV prevalence (Table 1). Countries of southern Africa
have, on average, a peak prevalence which is nearly 20
percentage points higher than in the countries of east
Africa and nearly 25 percentage points higher than in
west and central Africa.
In this lecture I attempt to shed some light on why
it should be that the HIV pandemic should be so partic-
ularly severe in southern Africa and then consider ideas
about what we should try to do to rectify this situation
– in the short, medium and long term. 
Others have carried out ecological analyses of the
pan-African distribution of HIV prevalence. It has been
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Figure 1A:  Map of sub-Saharan Africa by colo-
nial power, 1955.
Figure 1B:  Map of sub-Saharan Africa by distri-
bution of peak HIV prevalence in urban areas,
up to 2007.  Data from UNAIDS Fact Sheets. 
4shown repeatedly, for instance, that HIV prevalence
declines significantly with the proportion of males cir-
cumcised in a country (Drain et al., 2004, 2006; Werker
et al., 2006). Indeed much of the recent analysis of the
distribution of HIV prevalence in Africa has centred on
adjusting HIV prevalence for various other possible risk
factors in order to demonstrate that, having made all of
these adjustments, there is still a strong significant pro-
tective effect of male circumcision.
By itself, the proportion of males circumcised ac-
counts for about 74% of the variance in peak HIV preva-
lence as estimated from the UNAIDS 2006 Epidemio-
logy Fact Sheets for urban sites in 42 sub-Saharan
African countries (Fig. 3; see also Williams et al., 2006).
However, the situation is not nearly as clear when ana-
lysis is carried out on countries within the different
regions. Univariate analysis within three African regions
only produces a significant relationship between HIV
prevalence and circumcision rates for east Africa (Table
2). By contrast the proportion of Muslims in a country
was a significant factor in each region separately.
We should be clear, however, that the last two
Figure 2: The distribution of peak HIV preva-
lence levels between countries in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Figure 3:  Peak HIV prevalence, as a function of the proportion of men circumcised in the
countries of four different regions in sub-Saharan Africa.
Factor Coefficient (95% CI; P)
(Constant) 6.4   ( 2.4, 9.8; 0.002)
Region
West [Reference]
Central 2.6   ( -4.1, 9.3; 0.44 )
East 8.7   ( 2.8, 14.7; 0.005)
Southern 26.5   (20.3, 32.7; <0.001)
Table 1:  Analysis of variance of peak HIV
prevalence by country in four sub-Saharan
African regions; r2 = 0.66.
5years have seen the publication of results from three
randomised control trials on the effect of medical male
circumcision on the acquisition of HIV infection (Auvert
et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2007; Bailey et al., 2007). All
agreed in showing a significant protective effect for men;
medical male circumcision in each case resulted in at
least a halving of the annual rate of new HIV infections.
Thus, while ecological studies of the distribution of HIV
prevalence in Africa may be open to criticism, the inci-
dence studies provide much more compelling and une-
quivocal evidence.
The protective effect of male circumcision against
the transmission of HIV infection from females to males
is thus a less contentious issue than it has been; and the
results of the ecological studies referred to above are
thus of less interest in this regard. Indeed, given the re-
sults in Tables 1 and 2, there is a case for standing the
argument on its head. Instead of making adjustments in
efforts to demonstrate the protective effects of male
circumcision, we could rather adjust for male circumci-
sion and look at the residual variance due to other fac-
tors. As we will see, what emerges from this analysis are
strong residual regional and religious effects, which sug-
gest what may be important underlying determinants of
the HIV epidemic.
COMPARING HIV PREVALENCE 
LEVELS BETWEEN COUNTRIES
I
n analysing the distribution of HIV prevalence between
countries, it has been the practice to compare preva-
lences between countries at a single point in time. This
has been justified on the grounds that standards of HIV
testing have changed, and improved, over the years. It is
thus difficult to know how to compare over time preva-
lence estimates from the same country. Regardless of
the problems associated with past estimates of HIV
prevalence, however, it is not valid to compare HIV pre-
valence between countries which are at different stages
of the epidemic. A single example should suffice to make
this point. In the year 2000 HIV prevalence in urban
Uganda was about 8%; in Swaziland it was nearly five
times this level at 37%. But this huge difference is entire-
ly due to the timing of the analysis. If the comparison had
been done in 1992, for instance, the Swazi HIV preva-
lence would have been only about 5% and the Uganda
prevalence six times as high at nearly 30%.
Given the above, it is clear that analysis of HIV pre-
valence data, and identification of risk factors using
multi-country data, should only be carried out using
data from a similar stage of the epidemic in each coun-
try. In particular it makes sense to compare the peak
levels of HIV. We obtained from the UNAIDS Epide-
miology Fact Sheets all available antenatal clinic data on
HIV prevalence in urban settings from 42 sub-Saharan
countries and fitted the time series of data using a dou-
ble logistic function. We attempted to ameliorate the
variability of these estimates over time, and to reduce
the effect of serious outliers in the data, by taking as the
peak value the smaller of the observed and predicted
peak values of prevalence.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF MALE
CIRCUMCISION AND 
RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS IN THE 
SAME MODEL
I
n an analysis of HIV prevalence in 122 developing coun-
tries Drain et al. (2004) analysed the effects of male cir-
cumcision and religion separately on the grounds that
the percent of males circumcised was collinearly corre-
lated with the proportion of Muslim populations. They
were thus unable to disentangle the proportion of the
protective effect accruing to male circumcision and that
accruing to other cultural norms particular to the Mus-
lim faith. In a later paper Drain et al. (2006) did try to
separate the effects of religion and male circumcision by
looking at HIV prevalence in countries stratified on the
Fraction Muslim Fraction Circumcised
Region Coefficient (95% CI; r2; P)
Univariate analyses
Southern -37.2   (-74.1, - 0.4; 0.37;   0.048) - 8.6 (-55.5, 38.4;   0.03;   0.68 )
East -31.3   (-46.3, -16.2; 0.71;   0.001) -29.2 (-42.8,  -15.6;   0.72;   0.001)
Central/West - 7.4  ( -12.1, - 2.7; 0.31;   0.003) -12.8 (-25.8, 0.1;   0.17;   0.052)
Table 2:  The relationship between peak HIV prevalence and the fractions of Muslims and of males
circumcised by country in various sub-Saharan African regions.  With these units, for every 1%
increase in the fraction that are Muslim (or males that are circumcised) the prevalence decreases by
1% of the value of the corresponding coefficient.  In southern Africa, for example, the decrease would
be 0.372% per unit increase in the proportion Muslim.
basis of the proportion of Muslims (or Christians) in the
country. They did not, however, provide a quantitative
measure of the protective effect of Muslim behavioural
norms other than male circumcision. 
In another study a similar analysis noted that the
impact of circumcision on the AIDS rate was larger than
the impact of the Muslim variable, which included cir-
cumcision as well as behavioural norms (Werker et al.,
2006), apparently implying that no added protection
accrues from Muslim behavioural norms. The following
development shows that this is not the case.
We define: 
γ m = fraction of Muslim males circumcised = 1
γ n = fraction of non-Muslim males circumcised
γ m , n = overall fraction of males circumcised
µ = proportion of Muslims in the population
We initially set up the model for HIV prevalence (π ) as
the sum of the effects of the proportion Muslim, the
proportion of males circumcised and the region:
π =a0+a1 µ +a2γ
m , n+α 3 (R ) (1)
where a
0
is the intercept in the regression model; a1
and a2 are the coefficients giving the decrease in HIV
prevalence per unit increase in the percent Muslim and
percent males circumcised in the population, respective-
ly; a3 gives the increase in prevalence in a given region
(R), relative to the region with the lowest prevalence.
Notice that for an entirely non-Muslim country 
(i. e. when µ=0 ): 
π (0)=a
0
+a
2
γ n+a
3
(R) (2)
from which it is clear that a
2
is the coefficient for the pro-
tective effect of being circumcised. Notice that we are
implicitly assuming that the protective effect of circumci-
sion is the same for a Muslim as for a non-Muslim man.
In a country which is entirely Muslim (i. e.
µ = 1 and γ = 1 ):
π (1 )=a
0
+a
1
+a
2
+a
3
(R) (3)
so that the difference in predicted peak prevalence
between two countries, one entirely Muslim, and one
entirely non-Muslim but where all males are circumcised,
(i. e. where γ n =1) is given by π(1)-π(0)=a
1
. Thus the
total protective effect of being Muslim (as a result of
being circumcised and of other cultural factors) is given
by a
1
+ a
2
.
Ideally, since the model in Equation (1) refers specif-
ically to HIV prevalence among the male population, we
should be fitting the model to observed levels of HIV
prevalence among males. But reliable data on HIV pre-
valence among males are simply not available at levels
sufficient to support a precise analysis. It is reasonable
to suppose, however, that the peak HIV prevalence
among men in various countries will be highly correlat-
ed with the peak prevalence among women in general,
and among pregnant women in particular. Accordingly,
we apply the above linear model to all available antena-
tal clinic HIV data from 42 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. Availability of reliable data also suggested the use
of data only from urban settings in each country.
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
OF THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION
ANALYSIS
A
ll of the factors offered had highly significant effects
on peak HIV prevalence (Table 3) and the inclusion
of just three factors accounted for 85% of the variance in
the data – despite the inherent variability in, and uncer-
tainty surrounding, the HIV prevalence estimates and 
the very simple model used to fit the time series for each
country. Applying Equation (1) to the results from Table
3, the results are rather straightforward to interpret. 
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Univariate Multivariate
Factor Coefficient (95% CI; P) Coefficient (95% CI; P)
a
0
Constant 24.2  ( 17.0,    31.4;    <0.001 )
a
1
Fraction Muslim -23.9  ( -33.6,  -14.2; 0.006) -9.3 (-15.7, -2.9;      0.006 )
a
2
Fraction Circumcised -35.4  ( -42.1, -28.7;  0.001) -16.0  (-25.5, -6.6;      0.001 )
Region
a
3
West / Central [Reference] [Reference]
East 7.9  ( 2.4, -13.5; 0.006) 5.3 (  0.9,      9.7;    0.020 )
Southern 25.7 ( 19.9, -31.5; <0.001) 13.8 (  7.5,   20.0;  <0.001)
Table 3:  Factors associated with peak HIV pre-
valence in various sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. Multiple regression using Equation (1).
The protective effect of being Muslim can be viewed,
crudely speaking, as the sum of protection as a result of
male circumcision (a2 = 16.0), which we assume applies
equally to males of all religious persuasion, and protec-
tion as a result of other effects (a1 = 9.3) associated
particularly with being Muslim. We should thus predict
that an entirely non-Muslim country, and one where no
male is circumcised, would have a peak HIV prevalence
16.0 + 9.3 = 25.3 percentage points higher than a Mus-
lim country where all males are, by assumption, circum-
cised. Notice that, as in an earlier study (Werker et al.,
2006), we also see in the univariate analysis (Table 3)
that the coefficient for the fraction of male population
circumcised is larger than that for the fraction of the
population Muslim. But, as we saw above from the mul-
tivariate analysis, this does not mean that there is no
added protective effect as a result of being Muslim.  
These effects are illustrated graphically in Fig. 4,
which also illustrates the substantial regional differences
in HIV prevalence, when due allowance is made for the
proportion of Muslims in the population and of the pro-
portion of men who are circumcised. For the nine coun-
tries in the southern region, HIV peaked at 13.8 per-
centage points higher than in west and central Africa and
at 8.5 points higher than in east Africa.
To recap: ecological studies in the past have tended
to concentrate on the importance of male circumcision
in reducing the risk of HIV infection. There has been a
tendency to try to explain regional differences in HIV
prevalence rates in terms of male circumcision rates –
making the point that countries in southern Africa,
which have lower rates of male circumcision than in
west Africa, also have much higher HIV prevalence.
The lesson to be learned from Table 3 is rather dif-
ferent. What we see from this analysis is that, even
when we adjust for male circumcision rates and indeed
for the proportion of Muslims in various countries, we
still find that HIV prevalence in southern Africa is very
much higher than in the rest, particularly the west, of
Africa. What the analysis also says is that even after
adjustment for male circumcision rates there is a still a
strong protective effect as a result of being Muslim,
nearly 60% of the protective effect of male circumcision
and, statistically, not differing from it significantly.
And these two results must surely raise in one’s
mind the obvious question: “Is there some common fac-
tor that we can see, which might simultaneously explain
why the risk of HIV infection is so much lower in Mus-
lim communities and so much higher among all coun-
tries in southern and, to a lesser extent, east Africa?”
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Figure 4:  Peak prevalence, as a function of the
proportion of Muslims in a country, predicted
for various levels of circumcision of non-Muslim
males in two regions of sub-Saharan Africa.
Predicted values are approximations only: thus,
predicted levels of zero (and negative) preva-
lence for proportions of Muslims close to unity
simply reflect the joint effects of data variability
and violations of the assumptions inherent in
the linear model. 
8In the ecological studies of Drain et al. (2004, 2006)
many factors are considered as possible risk factors for
HIV infection and, at least in univariate analyses, many
statistically significant effects were found: population
density, female literacy, poverty, skewed wealth distrib-
ution, the proportion of young people in a country,
human development index, sexual behaviour patterns
such as divorce, polygamy and fertility rates and age at
first intercourse, co-infection with other sexually trans-
mitted diseases and tuberculosis, and a large number of
variables related to health and health services immuni-
sation rates, the numbers of doctors in a country, and
various measures of sexual behaviour.
But, in multivariate modelling, the only factors among
those listed above which had statistically significant
effects were: i) the proportion of young people in the
population, which was positively correlated with HIV
prevalence; ii) immunisation rates, female literacy levels,
and numbers of doctors per head of population - which
were all negatively correlated with prevalence. None of
these factors seems to fit the requirement of being
simultaneously responsible for particularly raised HIV
prevalence in southern Africa and the reverse in pre-
dominantly Muslim countries. Other factors of potential
importance have, however, been ignored in the analyses
cited. Thus, in a little-quoted paper dating from 1991,
my fellow Zimbabwean, David Sanders and Abdulrah-
man Sambo argued that “the migrant system of labour
in southern and east Africa contributes to family sepa-
ration and the spread of disease (including AIDS), from
urban to rural areas as well as in the opposite direction”
(Sanders & Sambo, 1991; p 158). 
In the ecological studies mentioned above there is
no consideration of such effects. 
On the one hand this is not entirely surprising since
data on relative levels of family coherence, and of urban/
rural movements are difficult to quantify and to compare
between African countries. On the other hand, family
coherence seems a feature that is very strong in Muslim
culture and one that has also been particularly severely
compromised in southern Africa. Bearing in mind the
results encapsulated in Table 3, therefore, family struc-
ture, and factors which impact on that structure, may
provide important keys to an understanding of the dis-
tribution of HIV infection in Africa. It is therefore worth
considering some details of the historical development
of southern African society, the consequent impact on
family structure and how this may be related to the HIV
pandemic.
RHODES NOT ROADS
W
hen considering family separation and migration
in southern Africa the word “Apartheid” per-
haps jumps into your mind – Apartheid is a favourite
whipping boy in discussions of the roots of all evil in
southern Africa in general and for the HIV epidemic in
particular (Lurie, 2000). There can be no doubt that
Apartheid contributed greatly to the breakdown and
fragmentation of social and family life in South Africa,
but I think the problems have much older and rather
different origins as I shall explain shortly.
Similarly, when one thinks of the role that the
movement of people has played in the spread of HIV
there was in the past (Carswell et al., 1989), and some-
times still is, a tendency to demonise truck drivers.
Parallels were drawn between good road systems and
the rapid spread of the virus via commercial sex work-
ers at truck stops. Roads and road transport undoubt-
edly played a role, but the analysis above suggests a
quite different villain; it’s not roads we should be think-
ing of, rather we should be thinking of Rhodes. Cecil
John Rhodes. Because it was Rhodes, Alfred Beit and
their mining associates, aided and abetted by Lord
Alfred Milner, who sowed the seeds of the southern
African HIV epidemic – and many other problems that
are essentially sociological in nature. Let me explain.
In 1884, following the defeat of British forces at
Majuba, Paul Kruger signed, under duress, the Con-
vention of London which gave the Transvaal indepen-
dence in all matters except control over its foreign
affairs. What neither side was to know was that gold
would be discovered in the heart of the quasi-indepen-
dent territory just two years later. Gold in unprece-
dented quantities; and gold which Kruger’s volk were
not then in a position to mine and exploit fully for them-
selves. Most people here will know better than I what
then developed. I note only that, according to one ana-
lysis, it was essentially Milner’s efforts, helped particu-
larly with funding from Beit, that heaped unbearable
diplomatic, and then military, pressure on Kruger –
making demands which Milner prayed Kruger would
reject (Pakenham, 1979). Ultimately the pressure told
on Kruger, who seems to have been persuaded by
Smuts that, if it had to be war, then the Transvaal should
strike first. The Transvaal sent the British an ultimatum
and, when it expired, invaded Natal. Milner’s prayers
had been answered – though the less than edifying peri-
od in British colonial history which followed was per-
haps not quite what Milner had in mind.
For Milner, and Rhodes, the battle had always been
about “Empire”; but the real impetus behind the battle
in South Africa was the gold. And, putting aside the
rights and wrongs of the Anglo-Boer war, the subse-
quent explosive expansion of the goldfields led to mas-
sive development in South Africa and further finance for
commercial expansion into the neighbouring territories
funded in large part by people like Rhodes and Beit.
And it wasn’t just the material wealth that Rhodes
and company needed from the neighbouring countries.
Because there was a major problem with the gold on the
rand. The geologists quickly found that most of the gold
was deep underground – and the deeper the gold the
more expensive it was to mine. All costs had to be kept
to a minimum; and labour costs, in particular, had to be
cut to the bone, especially because the demand for
labour was huge. As a consequence the South African
mines needed manpower from neighbouring countries.
And I do mean “man” – not the more politically correct
“person”; women were almost entirely excluded from
the equation. There could be no question of having black
families living on the rand; only the males could do the
heavy work underground, so only males would be
housed.
And housed they were; hundreds of thousands of
men at any one time all over the Transvaal and then the
Orange Free State. Not just from South Africa, but from
Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland,
Mozambique, South West Africa, Swaziland and Basuto-
land. Over the years companies such as “Wenela”
brought millions of healthy, strong and virile young men
for a stint on the mines. Their wives and womenfolk
were at home all over southern Africa; they saw each
other perhaps only once a year. In between times …
well, I don’t have to tell you what strong, virile young
men are wont to do – particularly when they have rather
more money than their peers in general and young ladies
in particular. And what of their wives and girlfriends left
at home for months at a time? It was a catastrophe wait-
ing for something like an HIV virus to come along.
We should not single out only the mines, and cer-
tainly not just the South African mines, as the sole vil-
lain of the piece. As Sanders and Sambo (1991) point
out, the British tried to use forced labour in Uganda,
and later recruited Rwandans and Malawians to work
there on the coffee and tea estates. And the principle of
having males only living and working on mines, as well
as on farms and plantations – and even as domestic
workers in big cities – became the norm all over British
southern, and to an extent, eastern Africa. The pattern
was more or less similar everywhere from the Cape
through the Rhodesias, Tanganyika and to the “White
Highlands” of Kenya. In cities in Southern Rhodesia,
until well into the 1960s, it was illegal for a (white)
employer to allow his (black) manservant to have his
wife living on the premises with him.
THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF OSCILLATORY
MIGRATION PATTERNS 
W
hat became entrenched was a system where,
typically, men lived and worked in cities or on
large estates; they returned, perhaps only once or twice
a year, to their wives and families, who typically had to
maintain a foothold in the countryside, farming a small
piece of land, with little support. 
While there is little, if any, direct evidence to link
this system of oscillating migration and the resulting
damage to family structure to its epidemiological conse-
quences, we can offer some indirect evidence. Using a
diffusion model for the spread of an infection like HIV it
is easy to demonstrate the intuitively obvious fact that
even high levels of sexual activity, and partner change,
leads to surprisingly low rates of epidemic expansion –
as long as all of this sexual activity is also strictly loca-
lised. An African version of Peyton Place, or Desperate
Housewives, if you prefer. Thus, while concurrent rela-
tionships (Epstein, 2007) may well be important neces-
sary conditions for building an epidemic they are not
sufficient. What we also need is that the partners, con-
current or not, are geographically separated.
The modelling shows that if even 10% of a person’s
sexual activity is directed in a geographically distant
location the spread of the epidemic is spectacularly dif-
ferent (see graphic in Supplementary Methods for this
lecture on www.sacema.ac.za). This model, which mim-
ics the essential features of oscillating migration, also
suggests why such migration is an essential component
for an epidemic to be as severe as the one we are wit-
nessing in southern Africa.
Even within the southern African HIV epidemiologi-
cal epicentre there are indications that those people
who have the strongest family structures and psychoso-
cial support systems are also least likely to acquire HIV
infection.
Multivariate analysis of HIV prevalence data from
Harare, Zimbabwe (Table 4) shows that women who
are HIV-infected are more likely than HIV-negative
women to be unmarried, have not completed sec-
ondary school education, rent or live with extended
family rather than own their home, be unemployed,
have a husband with fewer years of schooling and a 
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non-professional occupation, and have an extremely
low family income and no religious affiliation (Humphrey
et al., 2007). 
Low income of itself was less important than other
factors, being only associated with increased HIV-1 pre-
valence among women with the lowest 3% of incomes. In
short, what seemed to be important was the strong “psy-
chosocial support” typical of a settled family lifestyle.
THE LONG-TERM SOLUTION
R
egardless of anything else I say below, the preced-
ing analysis supports very strongly the ideas
advanced by Sanders and Sambo (1991) that the HIV
pandemic in this part of the world has its roots in struc-
tural deficiencies – and not in the inherently aberrant
sexual behaviour wrongly attributed to African popula-
tions. That paper, published in 1991, was remarkable in
that the HIV prevalences rates at that time in the urban
areas of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa
were “only” 8%, 5%, 2% and 4%, respectively. How much
more powerfully can the point be made today when the
prevalence levels are 6 to 15 times higher in these
southern African countries (UNAIDS Epidemiology Fact
Sheets, 2006). Sanders and Sambo did not explicitly pre-
dict the tsunami of HIV that was about to overwhelm
South Africa and its immediate neighbours south of the
Limpopo but, given that they identified so accurately the
structural deficiencies that seem so self-evidently im-
portant in the development of the epidemic, the pre-
diction was almost inescapable for those countries that
have been the most severely affected by the oscillating
migration associated with the mines, farms and cities of
southern Africa. 
The inescapable conclusion must be we need to
address urgently the issue of how we can rebuild family
structures in southern and eastern Africa. Without that
change we may confidently predict extreme difficulty in
dealing effectively not only with the HIV epidemic, but
also with many other problems having similar sociolog-
ical determinants.
CHANGING HIV PREVALENCE AND
INCIDENCE IN ZIMBABWE
G
iven the extreme difficulty involved in changing soci-
ological patterns, particularly employment practices
that have been entrenched for more than 
100 years – and practices that are implicitly so beneficial
for big business (regardless of the language spoken by the
bosses or the colour of their skins) – one must conclude
that sociological improvement will be slow in coming.
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Variable n Odds ratio (95% confidence interval)
Marital status Married 13 198 1
Single 638 1.36 (1.13, 1.63)
Divorced 174 1.54 (1.13, 2.11)
Widowed 100 3.97 (2.53, 6.23)
Mother’s religion Non Catholic 10 643 1
Catholic 2709 1.19 (1.09. 1.31)
None 705 1.31 (1.11, 1.55)
Mother’s education Secondary 11 515 1
<Secondary 2542 1.58 (0.99, 2.53)
Father’s education Secondary 12 701 1
<Secondary 1356 2.27 (1.25 - 4.13)
Father’s occupation Profession 2306 1
Other 11 751 1.22 (1.10, 1.35)
Mother’s housing Own 1464 1
Other 12 593 0.43 (0.24, 0.77)
Family income (US$/mo) ≥18 10 332 1
< 18 357 1.45 (1.16, 1.82)
Missing 3378 1.18 (1.08, 1.29)
Table 4:  Regression analyses of risk factors for prevalent HIV infection among postpartum women enrolled in
ZVITAMBO trial.  Also adjusted for date of recruitment, age and parity
The essential structural elements that predispose
southern Africa to disastrous levels of HIV infection and
other social ills are therefore likely to remain largely
intact for the foreseeable future. Given that reality, can
there be any ray of light, any glimmer of hope, in what
is now the epicentre of the pandemic? Curiously, I think
there is – even within the very heart of darkness. De-
spite all the economic, social and legal shambles, and the
human rights abuses that characterise Robert Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe (Todd, 2007), we see the curious fact that
HIV prevalence among women attending antenatal clin-
ics (ANCs) in Harare has been declining at nearly 10%
per annum since about 1998 (Fig. 5) (Mahomva et al.,
2006). Moreover, basic epidemiological principles sug-
gest that HIV incidence – i.e. the rate of occurrence of
new infections – started to decline in 1994. Mathe-
matical modelling (Hallet et al., 2006) suggests that these
declines could not be attributed solely to the direct
effects of increased deaths among HIV-positive individ-
uals, but were associated with declines in HIV incidence
and changes in sexual behaviour. 
Hallet et al. (2006) fitted the Zimbabwe ANC data for
2000-2004 with a model that sees risky sexual behaviour
halving after 2000, though they do not suggest why, or
how, such a decline in incidence might have arisen. From
more extensive Harare ANC data it appears, however,
that HIV prevalence among younger (<24 years old)
women has actually been declining since 1994. Since the
vast majority of the HIV-positive members of this age
group must have been infected relatively recently, this
suggests that the decline in incidence, and reduction in
risky behaviour, started as early as 1994.
That is not to diminish the importance of death in
the changing face of the HIV epidemic. HIV incidence
will decline as a natural direct consequence of the early
attrition of that class of society exhibiting the riskiest
sexual behaviour. If there is no accompanying change in
human behaviour, however, the incidence soon levels
off and equilibrium is established where the death rate
matches the rate of occurrence of new infections and
the HIV prevalence is maintained at a high level.
But death can also have an indirect effect on HIV inci-
dence prevalence if human beings react to the manifest
effects of the HIV epidemic by changing their behaviour.
And the evidence of massively increased death rates in
the recent past is all too manifest in Harare. An area of
150 hectares just south of Harare that was bush just ten
years ago is now a massive cemetery with tens of thou-
sands of closely packed graves (Supplementary Material).
Mathematical modelling shows that it is possible to
produce a good fit to the HIV prevalence in Fig. 5 under
the assumption that the rate of occurrence of new in-
fections decreases as the observed death rate increases.
The best fit of the model to the HIV incidence and pre-
valence data suggests, moreover, that the death rate
should have peaked in about 2001/2, as indeed appears
to be the case from the records of deaths in Harare.
The fit is thus consistent with the not unreasonable
contention that people have modified their behaviour
according to the death rate at any given time. The par-
ticular mathematical assumption that incidence declines
exponentially with death rate does, however, come with
the consequence that reductions in risky behaviour lead
to declines in the death rate – and thus, by our model,
subsequent increases in risky behaviour. The predicted
incidence, prevalence and death rates thus level off 
instead of continuing to decline steadily (Fig. 5). The
model does not, in other words, attribute any “memory”
or “learning behaviour” to the individuals modelled.
Levels of risky behaviour simply increase or decrease me-
chanically as a simple inverse function of the death rate. 
On the one hand it is to be hoped – and this is my
expectation – that this is an unduly misanthropic view of
humankind, and that people will actually be (even) more
thoughtful in their response to the observed effects of
HIV than suggested by our model. Conversely, many
would view mine as an unrealistically optimistic view of
the world. Indeed the suggestion that HIV incidence has
indeed been declining in Harare, and that this must be
due to changes in behaviour, has met with great scepti-
cism from some scientists. One is left with the feeling
that they find it hard to believe that people are capable
of altering their sexual behaviour – except perhaps
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Figure 5:  Estimated (dots) and fitted (curves)
HIV incidence (red) and prevalence (blue) and
deaths (black) among women attending ante-
natal and maternity clinics in Harare,
Zimbabwe (Data from Mahomva et al., 2006).
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through enlightened government policy, or via the in-
sightful intervention by a generously funded internation-
al organisation.
Judith Todd takes a more optimistic view of human
behaviour (Todd, 2007). She notes that Zimbabweans
overwhelmingly rejected Ian Smith’s offer of a political
settlement in 1972, brokered by the British government
via the Pearce Commission. In 2000 they, similarly, over-
whelmingly rejected Robert Mugabe’s offer of a new con-
stitution which brought promise of free farm land. The
leadership in both cases drew the conclusion that the
electorate was politically naïve and easily led astray by the
unscrupulous; black nationalists in the first instance –
white farmers in the second. Todd, who has been cruel-
ly persecuted under both governments, drew a quite dif-
ferent conclusion; she argues that, in both cases, the peo-
ple very accurately detected evil intent and rejected it.
Perhaps that same simple human intelligence, rather
than the efforts of governments and aid agencies, is the
most important factor underlying the decline in HIV
prevalence seen not only in Harare, but also in Uganda
and increasingly in other countries in the region (Hallet
et al., 2006). And perhaps governments and aid agencies
find this pill so hard to swallow because it so diminish-
es our efforts. Nonetheless, if true, what the message
implies is that the most important role of the scientist
remains exactly as it has been for millennia – the objec-
tive and accurate dissemination of information.
THE DEVELOPING HIV EPIDEMIC 
IN SOUTH AFRICA
T
his more optimistic view might appear at first sight
to find little support from the observed develop-
ment of the HIV epidemic in South Africa - where by
2006 there is still no evidence of the beginnings of the
rapid decline in HIV prevalence observed in Harare 
(Fig. 6) - despite the abundant and direct evidence
everywhere in South Africa of the effects of HIV infec-
tion. It is true that HIV prevalence for 2006 was mar-
ginally (though not significantly) lower than for 2005
(Fig. 6) and estimates from the ASSA model (Dorring-
ton et al., 2006) suggest that HIV incidence has started
to decline. It is also true (Fig. 6) that the epidemic in
South Africa lags the Zimbabwean epidemic by about
eight years, so that it is possible (though not in the least
guaranteed) that we might be about to witness a simi-
larly sharp decline in HIV prevalence in South Africa.
Nonetheless the present levels of HIV infection are
entirely unacceptable. Even in Zimbabwe, where HIV
prevalence appears to have been declining rapidly for at
least six years, the last published estimates of HIV pre-
valence in Harare ANCs was still about 20% (Fig. 5) –
hardly a healthy situation. Much the same can be said of
other southern African countries and so we need to ask
what, if anything, we can do to influence this situation in
a positive manner. 
ONE SMALL SNIP FOR MAN …
T
here is evidence in some instances of HIV prevalence
and incidence declining as a consequence of behav-
ioural change. This has sometimes been attributed to
direct governmental action – as was argued when 
the Thai government pressured female sex workers to
use condoms with their clients (Nelson et al., 1996).
Similarly Stoneburner and Low-Beer (2004) attribute
declining HIV prevalence in Uganda during the 1990s to
“population mobilization”, which involved the efforts of
central government and civil society. The importance of
external intervention, other than education regarding the
nature and dangers of HIV, is unclear. The declines in HIV
incidence and prevalence in Zimbabwe, for instance (Fig.
5), have been of a similar order to those observed in
Uganda – but have not been linked to intervention on the
scale attributed to the governments of Uganda or
Thailand. This area continues to be a matter of debate.
What is not a matter of debate is that there is cur-
rently very little by way of alternative options in the
drive to reduce HIV incidence. Whereas very large
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Figure 6:  HIV prevalence among women
attending antenatal and maternity clinic in
Harare, Zimbabwe (Mahomva et al., 2006) and
South Africa (UNAIDS Epidemiology Fact
Sheets, 2006).
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sums of money continue to be invested in the develop-
ment of HIV vaccines, and of microbicides that could be
used to block infection chemically, the sad truth is that
there is no chemical product of any kind that is cur-
rently useable to reduce HIV incidence. Indeed organi-
sations centrally involved in the production of such
chemicals are of the opinion that we are years away
from delivering even a partially effective vaccine or
microbicide (AVAC, 2007).
In the light of the absence of viable chemical protec-
tion, the recent publication of the results of three ran-
domised control trials demonstrating a more than 50%
protective effect of male circumcision on female-to-male
transmission of HIV (see references above) is a matter of
importance. Mathematical modelling suggests that a full-
scale roll-out of male circumcision in sub-Saharan Africa
could avert 2.0 (95% ci 1-3.8) million new HIV infections
and 0.3 (95% ci 0.2-0.5) million deaths over the next ten
years. Over the ten years thereafter a further 3.7 (95% ci
1.9-7.5) million new HIV infections and 2.7 (95% ci 
1.5-5.3) million deaths could similarly be averted.
The above modelling involved contributions from
several SACEMA associates, and SACEMA has from its
inception taken an active interest in the development of
male circumcision as an intervention and continues to
support Prof Bertran Auvert in his development of both
the theoretical and practical aspects of the work.
The success of the intervention as modelled above
depends, of course, on the assumption that the natural
reduction in the probability of female-to-male transmis-
sion of the HIV virus in circumcised men is not offset by
increases in risky behaviour tending to reduce, nullify or
even over-compensate for the protective effect. The
only way to find out is to move towards a more gener-
al roll-out of male circumcision as an intervention
method and, crucially, to follow the circumcised men to
compare their HIV incidence relative to men in the gen-
eral population. 
SACEMA fully supports the idea of expanding the
application of medical male circumcision in South Africa:
as a natural follow-up to randomised control trials, such
operational research will allow the further assessment
of the challenges associated with applying the procedure
on larger scales, whilst providing the necessary time to
assess the longer-term protective effects.
Further indications of the protective effects of med-
ical male circumcision would inevitably influence cultural
leaders of non-circumcising ethnic groups to reassess
their attitudes to the practice. Moreover, even among
groups who do habitually circumcise their males it may
lead to a re-assessment of the timing and means of male
circumcision. It has been noted that the absence of clear
differences in HIV prevalence rates between South Afri-
can ethnic groups who do, and do not, circumcise their
males may be related to the manner in which the cir-
cumcision is carried out. Medical observers note that tra-
ditional male circumcision can remove variable amounts
of the foreskin and that, therefore, the protective effect
of traditional male circumcision against HIV infection may
be less than optimal. 
If the observed ongoing results of increased frequen-
cy of medical male circumcision are sufficiently positive,
the medical fraternity may need to start asking questions
about whether they should be advising parents of all eth-
nic groups to have their sons medically circumcised at
birth as a matter of course. To the objection that this
flies in the face of long-standing cultural values, one may
counter quite simply that cultures do, and should,
change: and there is no better reason to change than in
the interests of survival. Regardless of the changes which
do, or do not, occur with regard to future male circum-
cision practices, what is of paramount importance is that
all male circumcisions should be carried out with the
utmost regard to safety for the patient. 
ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY AS AN
OFFENSIVE WEAPON
T
he above discussion of methods available for reduc-
ing HIV incidence and prevalence has centred on
prevention of infection. With double-digit HIV preva-
lence levels throughout southern Africa, however, we
have massive numbers of people who are already infect-
ed with HIV. There has, quite rightly, been increasing
pressure over the years to improve access to antiretro-
viral therapy – with the major emphasis on the im-
proved survival and quality of life of the patient, consis-
tent with considerations of delaying treatment so as to
lessen the time spent on drugs which can have unpleas-
ant side-effects and simultaneously reducing costs and
the chances of developing resistance. These arguments
are used to justify the standard practice in Africa of
starting ART only when the CD4 count drops to 200,
or when an HIV positive patient presents with symp-
toms typical of a WHO stage 3 or 4 infection.
There are several problems with this approach:
i) As a patient’s CD4 count declines the probability of
acquiring opportunistic infections increases. In par-
ticular, by the time the count approaches 200 many
will already have TB – which has to be treated  be-
fore ART can commence:
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ii) Even if the patient has not acquired TB, if the CD4
count is below 200 at the onset of ART this count
does not fully recover in some patients. While the
mean CD4 count increases, the increase in the mode
is less impressive, and there is a proportion of
patients whose CD4 count remains below 200:
iii) Even after three years on ART the probability of in-
fection with TB is several times higher than in HIV
negative people:
iv) These results are consistent with suggestions that pro-
longed infection with HIV leads to accelerated se-
nescence of the immune system (Appay et al., 2007).
While none of these lines of evidence may be com-
pelling by itself, together they do constitute an argu-
ment in favour of a markedly earlier onset of antiretro-
viral therapy – in the interests of the individual HIV pos-
itive patient. And there is a further important epidemi-
ological reason for wanting to start therapy earlier.
Analysis of data from one study in the Cape showed
that, whereas the roll-out was reaching seven times the
national average in terms of the proportion of patients
on ART among those who qualify, the HIV positive
patients who were not enrolled into ART therapy were
predominantly people under 30 years of age. On the
one hand, this is entirely natural since the youngest peo-
ple tend, by definition, to have been HIV positive for the
shortest time. Thus the proportion with a CD4 count
less than 200 is smaller than in older age groups. On the
other hand, the young are the most sexually active age
group and thus the most important target for any pro-
gramme that aims to reduce transmission rates. Earlier
onset of ART would have the important and natural epi-
demiological effect of reducing the viral load in larger
numbers of sexually active patients and would thereby
automatically reduce the probability of this group infect-
ing their sexual partners. It seems, therefore, that there
is a convergence of the individual and population inter-
ests in the early recruitment of HIV-positive patients
into ART programmes.
If modelling indicates that the aggressive use of ART
in this way could be of service in reducing HIV inci-
dence, there may be a further argument for a more
active approach towards the identification of HIV-posi-
tive cases such that major reductions in viral load can be
effected in the greatest proportion of HIV-positive peo-
ple. While political considerations currently prevent
general compulsory HIV testing, it is interesting to note
that Botswana has already moved to an “opt out”
approach to HIV testing. That is to say that anybody vis-
iting a clinic can automatically be given an HIV test –
unless they specifically ask not to be tested.
CONCLUSION
I
have mentioned above various possible measures
aimed at addressing the immediate problem of reduc-
ing HIV incidence in South Africa: earlier roll-out of
antiretroviral therapy, coupled with a more aggressive
approach to case detection and promotion, and proac-
tive promotion of male circumcision. Any such inter-
vention will have to be combined with education pro-
grammes concerning the reasons for male circumcision
and especially the fact that it gives partial but not com-
plete protection so that the use of condoms must still
be strongly promoted. The roll-out of ART will have to
be combined with education and counselling especially
in regard to protecting one’s partner and future chil-
dren but may also serve as a way of encouraging people
to come forward for testing. These interventions will
need very substantial commitment and financial
resources and much of the responsibility for this will fall
on the shoulders of government. There will undoubted-
ly be debate about the wisdom of these approaches but,
even if they are as successful as we hope they will be,
one needs to be mindful of the fact that they essential-
ly amount to the management of an immediate crisis. 
None of these interventions – nor previous efforts
to encourage abstinence, fidelity or condom use –
address the fundamental social problems which have en-
sured that the HIV epidemic would be so severe in the
southern African region. Indeed AIDS in southern Africa
should be seen not only as a disease but also as a symp-
tom of social ills in general, and of the fragmentation and
breakdown of family life in particular. If the analysis pre-
sented here has any validity at all, what it implies is that
until we manage to address the underlying problem of
the breakdown of family structure in the region – and in
South Africa in particular – we must expect that our
populations will continue to be prey to HIV and to any
new sexually transmitted infection which arises.
Nor is the problem restricted simply to sexually
transmitted infections.  South Africa currently has one
of the highest rates of violent crime in the world. There
are twice as many murders in a year in Cape Town as
there are in the whole of England and Wales. One can
point a finger at inadequate policing, corruption and a
general lack of political will in combating crime.  But it
is tempting to suggest that high crime levels and the high
incidence of HIV infection have the same underlying
structural source - the breakdown of family structure
associated with oscillating migration.
In combating HIV-AIDS there is, of course, a contin-
uing imperative for scientific innovation, for education
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and mobilisation involving religious, community and
political leadership, and for increased efforts in provid-
ing effective treatment for those already infected. But,
the underlying cause of the HIV epidemic, and of many
of our social ills, has its roots in policies set in motion
more than a century ago. The present government is
not responsible for those policies. They are, however,
in the unenviable position of having inherited the
responsibility for the consequences - and therefore
need to mobilise all appropriate help in addressing the
underlying cause of the HIV epidemic in South Africa.
16
REFERENCES
Appay V, Almeida JR, Sauce D et al. 2007 Accelerated
immune senescence and HIV-1 infection.
Experimental Gerontology 42, 432-437.
Auvert B, Taljaard D, Lagarde E, Sobngwi-Tambekou J
et al. 2005 Randomized, Controlled
Intervention Trial of Male Circumcision for
Reduction of HIV Infection Risk: The ANRS
1265 Trial. PloS Medicine 2: e298.
doi:10.137/journal.pmed.0020298.
AVAC 2007 Aids Vaccine Advocacy Coalition Report
2007. Resetting the clock. (www.avac.org).
Bailey RC, Moses S, Parker CB, Kawango A et al. 2007
Male circumcision for HIV prevention in young
men in Kisumu, Kenya: a randomised control
trial. Lancet 369, 643-656.
Carswell JW, Lloyd G, Howells J 1989 Prevalence of
HIV-1 in east African lorry drivers. AIDS. 11,
759–761.
Dorrington RE, Johnson LF, Bradshaw D and Daniel T
2006 The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in
South Africa. National and Provincial Indicators for
2006. Cape Town: Centre for Actuarial
Research, South African Medical Research
Council and Actuarial Society of South Africa. 
Drain PK, Smith JS, Hughes JP, Halperin DT, Holmes,
KK 2004 Correlates of national HIV seropreva-
lence.  An ecologic analysis of 122 developing
countries. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr 35, 
407-420.
Drain PK, Halperin DT, Hughes JP, Klausner JD, Bailey
RC 2006 Male circumcision, religion and infec-
tious diseases: an ecologic analysis of 118
developing countries. BMC Infectious Diseases
6:172 doi:10.1186/1147-2334-6-172.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2334/6/172.  
Epstein H 2007 The Invisible Cure: Africa, the West, and
the Fight against AIDS London, Penguin 326 pp.
Gray RH, Kigozi G, Serwadda D, Mukaumbi F, et al.
2007 Male circumcision for HIV prevention in
men in Rakai, Uganda: a randomised trial.
Lancet 369, 657-666.
Hallett TB, Aberle-Grasse J, Bello G et al. 2006
Declines in HIV prevalence can be associated
with changing sexual behaviour in Uganda,
urban Kenya, Zimbabwe, and urban Haiti.
Sexually Transmitted Infections 82, 1-8.
Humphrey JH, Nathoo KJ, Hargrove JW, Iliff PJ et al.
2007 HIV-1 and HIV-2 prevalence among post-
natal women in Harare, Zimbabwe: Associated
factors and indication of a decline beginning in
1999.  International Journal of Epidemiology 135,
933-42.
Lurie M Migration and AIDS in Southern Africa: A
Review 2000 South African Journal of Science 96,
343-347.
Mahomva AI, Greby S, Dube S, et al. 2006 HIV preva-
lence and trends from data in Zimbabwe, 1997
- 2004.  Sexually Transmitted Infections 82, 
i42-i47.
Nelson KE, Celentano DD, Eiumtrakol S, Hoover DR
et al. 1996 Changes in sexual behavior and a
decline in HIV infection among young men in
Thailand The New England Journal of Medicine
335, 297-303.
Pakenham T 1979 The Boer War London, Weidenfeld
and Nicholas 659 pp.
Sanders D, Sambo A 1991 AIDS in Africa: the implica-
tions of economic recession and structural
adjustment.  Health Policy and Planning 6, 
157-165.
Stoneburner RL, Low-Beer D 2004 Population-level
HIV declines and behavioral risk avoidance in
Uganda Science 304, 714-718.
Todd JG 2007 Through the Darkness: A Life in Zimbabwe
Cape Town, Struik Publishers 460 pp.
Werker E, Ahuja A, Wendell B 2006 Male circumci-
sion and AIDS: the macroeconomic impact of a
health crisis.  Harvard Business School Working
Paper Number: 07-025.
Williams BG, Lloyd-Smith JO, Gouws E, Hankins C,
Getz WM et al. 2006. The potential impact of
male circumcision on HIV in sub-Saharan
African populations. PLoS Medicine 3(7): e262.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.030262. 
